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COLLECTIVE LEGITIMIZATION IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
CONCEPT AND PRACTICE*
THoMAs L. BREwER**
The author defines collective legitimization as an act by
which legitimacy is attributed to national policy and
other "objects" by multilateral organizations. He de-
cribes the role of various organizations including the
United Nations in this process, and concludes that col-
lective legitimization will be used increasingly by
nations attempting to gain national and international
credibility. ED.
International organizations are no exception to the tend-
ency of institutions to perform functions not originally intended
for them. Thus, as Inis Claude has pointed out, the United Na-
tions and other international organizations have come to be re-
garded and used as agents for the legitimization of national
status, policies and actions.1
Although various social scientists since Max Weber have
given considerable attention to the role of legitimacy in na-
tional political systems, they have devoted little thought to its
role in the international system.2 And while such eminent
international relations specialists as Claude, Ernst Haas, and
Stanley Hoffman have given some thought to the nature and
role of legitimacy in international affairs, the total scholarly
output remains meager.3
* The author is indebted to Jerome Slater and Terry Nardin for criticisms
of an earlier draft and to Richard Johnson for an opportunity to read
his unpublished manuscript on the concept of legitimacy.
** Dr. Brewer is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Eastern Michi-
gan University. He received an M.A. from Yale University in 1964 and
a Ph.D. from the State University cf Buffalo in 1971.
1 I. CLAUDE, THE CHANGING UNITED NATIONS, ch. 4 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as CLAUDE]. Though the present article has been stimulated by Claude's
analysis, it seeks to extend our understanding of the concept and prac-
tice of collective legitimization beyond his pioneering work.
2 See D. EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE (1965) [herein-
after cited as EASTON]; S. LiPSET, POLITICAL MEN (1963); and M. WEBER,
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (T. Parsons ed.
1947).
3 CLAUDE, supra note 1; E. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE (1964); and
Hoffmann, Sisyphus and the Avalanche: The United Nations, Egypt, and
Hungary, 9 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 446-69 (1957). See also A.
Bargman, Collective Legitimization and Disarmament; J. Cefkin, Inter-
national Legitimization and Southern Africa: Principles and Practice;
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The importance of collective legitimization as a function of
international organizations suggests that more conceptual and
theoretical analysis is needed. This paper hopefully makes
some contributions in this area. More specifically, the purposes
of this paper are first, to define and develop the concept of
collective legitimization in order to render it more useful in the
analysis of international organizations, and second, to suggest
some tentative answers to the following questions. What is the
potential of international organizations for collective legitimiza-
tion, and what are the determinants of the potential? How have
international organizations been used by members to legitimize
their status and behavior? What are the salient trends and of
what significance are they? What are the consequences of the
use of international organizations for collective legitimization?
I have asserted that collective legitimization is an important
phenomenon in international relations. Legitimacy, of both
the establishment and the policies of a nation, is considered as a
necessary political goal by national leaders. Indeed, it has been
suggested that "politics is not merely a struggle for power,
but also a contest over legitimacy, a contest in which the con-
firmation or denial, the confirmation or revocation of legitimacy
is an important stake".4 Of equal importance is the fact that
legitimacy is a significant resource in the pursuit of power.5
Moreover, collective legitimization is a relatively efficient
process in this pursuit, for by gaining support based on legiti-
macy a nation can conserve other diplomatic resources. 6 In re-
viewing a study of British policy in the U.N., Ernst Haas has
observed:
British leaders painfully learned that in a world made inter-
dependent by the ideological, military, and economic clamor
which does not respect national frontiers, unilateral action en-
tails even more painful consequences than deference to unpalat-
able organizational decisions.7
and J. Slater, The Limits of Legitimization in International Organiza-
tion: The Case of the OAS, Sept. 3-7, 1968 (papers presented at the
1968 American Political Science Association Convention in Washington,
D.C.). A major recent addition to the literature on collective legitimiza-
tion, which appeared shortly before this manuscript went to the printer,
is R. RIGGS, U.S./U.N.: FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TION (1971). One of its central concerns is American utilization of the
U.N. for legitimization purposes.
4 CLAUDE, supra note 1, at 75-6.
5 Id.
G On the efficiency of legitimacy as a basis for compliance in national
political systems, see EASTON, supra note 2, at 278; and Merelman,
Learning and Legitimacy, 60 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REvIEw 548-
49 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Merelman].
7 Haas, The Comparative Study of the United Nations, 20 WORLD POLITICS
321 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Haas].
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While collective legitimization is thus important from the
vantage point of the defenders of the interests of nation-states,
it is equally important from that of supporters of international
organizations. As will be discussed more fully below, the use of
international organizations as agents of collective legitimization
has had and will continue to have an impact on the structure
and function of international organizations. Such use has facili-
tated the proliferation of organizations and organizational sub-
divisions, as in the cases of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development and the U.N. Special Committee on
Colonial Independence; and there is evidence that such use of
the U.N. has rendered it less effective in performing certain
functions.8
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE LEGIIVIZATION
Definitions
Collective legitimization can be defined as an act by which
legitimacy is attributed to national policy and other "objects"
by multilateral organizations.9 Three key terms in the defini-
tion can be briefly elaborated. First, the term "multi-lateral
bodies" has been used to include the activities of ad hoc con-
ferences as well as international organizaitons, although the
discussion of the paper will be limited to the legitimization
activities of international organizations. 10 Second, an "act" of
multilateral bodies can include not only the deployment of
troops and the inauguration of programs and projects but also
the passing of resolutions and all other activities that convey
legitimacy. Third, "objects" refer to the phenomena being
legitimized; these include national actions, attitudes and status.
To satisfy the crux of the definitional problem, a general
definition of legitimacy based on those proposed by two politi-
cal scientists specializing in fields other than international re-
lations will be used. David Easton refers to legitimacy as a
... conviction on the part of the [person] that it is right and
proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide
by the requirements of the regime ... In some vague or ex-
8 See infra at 87.
9Claude defines collective legitimization as "politically significant ap-
proval and disapproval of the claims, policies, and actions of states".
CLAUDE, supra note 1, at 73. But this definition ignores the question
of the ground on which approval and disapproval are based. Though
at another point he does consider the principles on which legitimacy is
bazed, the discussion does not seem to treat the subject adequately, as
I shall indicate below. Id. at 77-87.
10 CLAUDE, supra note 1, at 86, suggests the Bandung Conference of 1955 as
an example of an ad hoc conference designed for collective legitimiza-
tion purposes, in this case for the anti-colonialism movement. It should
be noted that countries also try to legitimitize their actions and status
by unilateral and bilateral actionc.
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plicit way he sees these objects as conforming to his own sense
of what is right and proper in the political sphere."
Richard Merelman refers to "political legitimacy" as "... the
quality of 'oughtness' that is perceived by the public to inhere
in a political regime which is viewed as morally proper for
a society". 12
Although one can accept the essence of these two defini-
tions, both are too specific for our purposes in two respects.
First, they specify the regime and the authorities as the objects
being legitimized; but in international relations the objects are
defined more broadly, also including national actions and atti-
tudes. Second, these two definitions by implication are limited
to legitimization of objects in the eyes of the domestic popula-
tions; again, in international relations there are also foreign
publics and governments for whom objects are legitimate. In
view of these two restrictions inherent in the above definitions,
they cannot be accepted intact for our purposes. However, by
modifying these two definitions, we can define legitimacy as a
quality of "oughtness", of being right and proper, that is attrib-
uted to some political object. The "legitimacy" becomes mean-
ingful for both national and international politics.
Principles of Legitimacy
This notion of right and proper raises the complex prob-
lem of what can be called the principles of legitimacy.13 Ac-
cording to Claude, legitimization always consists of a political
component which is predominant, and usually contains moral
and legal components. 14 But a concept defined in this way has
rather limited analytic utility since the nature and interrela-
tionships of its components- political, moral, and legal- are
unspecified.
I, therefore, propose to limit the concept to those attributed
characteristics that are based on moral considerations; thus, to
be perceived as right and proper on moral grounds is a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for a political object to be legiti-
mate. In most cases, moral grounds encompass both political
and legal components of legitimization in that a nation's politics
and laws are usually based on its perception of morality.
Particular acts of collective legitimization based on moral
grounds may nevertheless be expressed in legal terms. In some
11 EASTON, supra note 2, at 278.
12 Merelman, supra note 6, at 584.
13 I am accepting the terminology of CLAUDE, supra note 1.
14 Id. at 79-80.
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cases international law is so obviously grounded on considera-
tions of morality that it may be invoked as a legitimizing prin-
ciple. Hence, various provisions of the U.N. Charter may be in-
voked as principles of legitimization. This is not to say that all
Charter provisions are necessarily legitimizing principles, or
even that Charter provisions themselves are necessarily con-
sidered legitimate. Furthermore, the legitimacy of Charter pro-
visions may, with a change in moral outlook of the member
states, vary over time. For example, as Rupert Emerson has
pointed out, the Charter provision that trustee countries assure
that trust territories be peaceful1 5 was superceded by the wide-
spread attribution of illegitimacy to the entire trusteeship sys-
tem because the mere existence of trust territory status came
to be considered a threat to the peace.' 6 This particular change
is of course only part of the more general trend in the increas-
ing acceptance of anticolonialism as the dominant legitimizing
principle in U.N. activities.
A discussion of the collective legitimization of the de-
colonization process allows us to illustrate several additional
points about the evolution and use of principles of collective
legitimization. First, anticolonialism was itself legitimized by
prior formulations of what constituted legitimate behavior in
the international system. Specially, the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 17
was collectively legitimized by explicit reference to "the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter" and to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Second, this newly legitimized
principle as enunciated in the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was in turn
invoked to attribute illegitimacy to the continued practice of
colonialism in several particular instances, and was used to
attribute legitimacy to specific acts, such as the Indian attack
on Goa in 1961. The case of Goa and the International Court of
Justice ruling on South West Africa illustrate a third point
about principles of legitimacy: they may come into conflict
with international law. For instance, the International Court
of Justice ruling prompted the observation that the Court's
decision "can be expected to stimulate many states to respond
15U.N. CHARTER art. 76.
16Emerson, Colonialism, Political Development, and the U.N., in THE
UNITED NATIONS IN THE BALANCE 120-39 (N. Padelford & L. Goodrich eds.
1965) [hereinafter cited as Emerson].
17 G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc A/4684 (1960).
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that the South African position, while possibly legal, is cer-
tainly not legitimate".'8
Objects and Targets
Such a discussion of colonialism suggests that legitimacy
and illegitimacy are attributed by collective action to a variety
of phenomena or "objects". Such objects may be organized into
two types: actions and status. Actions include rather specific
acts, such as the Indian attack on Goa and the American inter-
vention in Korea in 1950, and also more long-term practices such
as colonialism. The status of nation states as sovereign mem-
bers of the international system is often an object of collec-
tive legitimization,' 9 as is the status of regimes, authorities and
indviduals.20 The Congo case may be used for illustrative pur-
poses. At stake in that episode was the status of a united Congo
as a legitimate nation state in the international system, the
status of the Leopoldville government as the legitimiate re-
gime and Kasavubu as a legitimate authority.
21
There are, moreover, a variety of "targets" of collective
legitimization represented by those people in whose view ob-
jects are being legitimized. Targets of legitimization include
not only domestic publics but also foreign publics. Government
and segments of publics may also be considered as targets.
22
The Legitimizing Capacity of Organizations
The United Nations is the most conspicuous example of an
international organization that has been utilized as an agency
for attempts to legitimize national actions and status. However,
certain regional organizations have also been used for collec-
tive legitimization. In considering the potential of various
organizations for achieving this function, several questions come
to mind. Do international organizations have an inherent
capacity to legitimize objects? Are there differences in the
capacities of regional organizations as compared with the U.N.?
Do legitimizing capacities vary over time? Implicit in all of
18 CLAUDE, supra note 1, at 85-6.
19 See the discussion of U.N. membership, infra at 82. For discussion
of the ICJ opinion denying legitimacy or legality see Gordon, 1 DENVER
J. INT'L L. & POLICY 65 (1971).
20 1 am following the terminology of David Easton; regime refers to "the
general matrix cf regularized expectations within the limits of which
political actions are usually considered authoritative", and authorities
to occupants of authoritative roles. EASTON, supra note 2, at 194, 212.
21 See, e.g., E. LEFEVER, CRISIS IN THE CONGO (1965). Note that it has been
stated that American action and U.N. support in Korea was legitimitized
in Japan only in the view of neutralist and pacifist groups.
22 See STUDY GROUP OF THE JAPANESE ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
JAPAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1958), reviewed, Haas, 53 AMERICAN
POLITCAL SCIENCE REVIEW 205, 210 (1959).
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these questions is the problem of the determinants of the legiti-
mizing capacity of international organizations. The following
discussion will be organized around a set of factors that de-
termine the legitimizing capacity.
The first determinent of such a capacity is the target; both
the variance from country to country of the perceived poten-
tial of an institution's legitimizing capabilities and the changing
of each country's attitudes toward the institution over time
must be recognized. In some countries the U.N. may be widely
accepted as an agent for the granting, withholding and with-
drawing of legitimacy; in other countries its legitimizing poten-
tial may be quite limited. However, the range of activities for
which a given international organization has legitimizing capa-
bilities will very among countries. While one country may con-
sider the U.N. to have a legitimizing capability over a wide
range of activities, another country may consider the U.N.'s
capability to be limited to a narrow range of activities.
The perceived legitimizing capability of an international
organization for a given country, then, may vary over time.
For instance, in reviewing the limited evidence available on
attitudes toward the U.N. in several countries as of 1960, Haas
observed:
On colonial, race policy, and national self-determination ques-
tions for example, attitude, expectation, and satisfaction patterns
evolved in opposite directions. In early years, Egypt and India
regarded the Charter as a pro-status quo conspiracy designed to
perpetuate the white man's injustice; in recent years, both coun-
tries have come to expect more and more successful anti-colonial
action from the U.N.
He adds that the attitude of developed states had followed a
similar pattern.2 3
Another determinant of the legitimizing capacity of an in-
ternational organization is the scope of the membership. Other
factors being equal, the larger the membership the greater the
legitimizing capacity. The supposition here is that the larger
the membership of an organization, the more its actions will be
perceived as based on widespread moral consensus. Two impli-
cations follow from this general postulate. First, the general
tendency for the membership of international organizations to
increase, leads to an increased legitimizing capacity. The legiti-
mizing capacity of the U.N. since the large increase in member-
ship following the 1955 "package deal" has been significantly
greater than before that arangement. Similiarly, an increase in
23 Id.
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the size of the Organization of American States by the entry
of the newly independent Caribbean countries has increased
the legitimizing capacity of that organization.
A second implication is that universal organizations have an
inherently greater legitimizing capacity than regional organiza-
tions because the latter are more likely to be dominated by a
single member. The legitimizing capacity of an organization
varies directly with the degree of dispersion of influence within
the organization. The Organization of American States and the
Warsaw Treaty Organization both have rather limited legiti-
mizing capabilities because they are perceived to be dominated
by single countries.
Within organizations the legitimizing capacity varies with
the function being performed. More specifically, the collective
security function of the U.N. has apparently fallen into dis-
repute while economic assistance and decolonization have ac-
quired increased legitimacy.2 4 There is evidence that the U.N.
support of the American intervention in Korea is responsible
for the decline of legitimacy attributed to the collective security
function.25
The nature of the principles of legitimization that are in-
voked provides an additional determinant of legitimizing capac-
ity. Actually, the significance of this factor is in turn dependent
on the composition of the organization and the manner in which
it is used for legitimization purposes. To be specific, in its
early years the U.N. could be used as an agent of collective
legitimization by the West in the Cold War because the illegiti-
macy of aggression could be invoked as a principle of legiti-
macy and because there was a Western majority dominated
by the United States. More recently the U.N. has been used
as an agent of collective legitimization by the new Afro-Asian
majority to legitimize de-colonization and economic assistance.
Thus in both eras in the United Nations, parties could success-
fully muster majority votes and invoke firmly grounded and
widely accepted principles of legitimacy.
The experience in the Organization of American States has
been somewhat different. For in that organization the United
States has attempted to invoke the legitimizing principle of na-
tional sovereignty (or non-intervention), a widely accepted
24 Haas, supra note 7, at 311.
25 Id. at 215. We can safely ignore the fact that the Korean action was
not a collective security action in the most meaningful sense of that
term. See I. CLAUDE, POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ch. 5 (1962);
A. WOLFERS, COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE WAR IN KOREA, IN DISCORD
AND COLLABORATION ch. 11 (1962).
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legtimizing principle, as a justification for its support of stabil-
ity. But stability is not a particularly compelling principle, espe-
cially among Latin American publics.2 Such a strategy can be-
come quite transparent, with the result that the utility of the
O.A.S. as a legitimizing organization is somewhat limited.
If the composition of the organizing is such that the ulti-
mate object of legitimization is not based on the moral con-
siderations of the members, the collective legitimization capacity
of the organization will be limited. For this reason, in the case
of the O.A.S., the strategy of collective action and acquiescence
to impute legitimacy to the American policy of national stability
has failed.27
The capacity of the O.A.S. for collective legitimization is
also limited by the final factor in our list of determinants
which is the manner in which international organizations and
principles of legitimization are utilized. Two characteristics of
the American use of the O.A.S. have served to diminish what
little potential for legitimization it may have had: (1) the United
States has overused the O.A.S. for collective legitimization pur-
poses; and (2) the United States has used the O.A.S. for very
little else.28 For both of these reasons, the O.A.S. has come to
be widely regarded in Latin America as no more than an or-
ganization for transparent attempts by the United States to
legitimize its actions. The O.A.S. has been described by Fidel
Castro as the State Department's "Ministry for Colonies". 29
One commentator has suggested that a similar fate may be
in store for the United Nations: "[T]he legitimacy of U.N. prin-
ciples is endangered by their being invoked hypocritically in
26See J. SLATER, THE OAS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY (1967)
[hereinafter cited as SLATER], especially the Introduction and Conclusion.
During the 1961-63 period the United States temporarily emphasized
the illegitimacy of dictatorial regimes.
27 It should be noted that my position here is at odds with that of Slater
and of Fox. Slater asserts that "the primary function of the O.A.S. has
been to legitimize the predominant role of the United States in the set-
tlement of most hemisphere conflicts, thus avoiding potential opposition
in the United States, in Latin America, and in the rest of the world".
Id. at 97. See also id. at 206-09, 279. The view of Fox is that the O.A.S.
has "served to ... legitimate and make more respectable the dominant
position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere". W. Fox & A.
Fox, NATO AND THE RANGE OF AMERICAN CHOICE 54 (1967). Such a
view depends on a more encompassing definition of collective legitimiza-
tion than the one I have suggested. On the other hand their interpreta-
tion surely implies that American policy-makers attempt to legitimize
their policies through the O.A.S.; and I fully agree with such an
implication.
28 SLATER, supra note 26.
29 This has happened in spite of U.S. attention. Id. at 273. To the neces-
sity of avoiding the appearance of an O.A.S. dominated by the U.S. see
id. at 274.
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excessively public debates" 0  The lesson for national policy-
makers interested in exploiting the legitimizing potential of
international organizations is that excessive and hypocritical
use of organizations for such purposes will be counterproduc-
tive in the long run; policy-makers will substantially reduce or
even eliminate altogether the very capability they are trying
to utilize.
Use of Collective Legitimization
Several ways in which national policy-makers have in fact
used this potential of international organizations have been
mentioned. But it is instructive to reorder some of these points
and discuss them in a different light.
In the United Nations and to a lesser extent in regional
organizations the pursuit of collective legitimization has para-
lelled the two dominant conflicts in the post-war international
system: the East-West struggle in the Cold War and the North-
South conflict over colonialism and economic development.
31
The Cold War protagonists have used a variety of U.N.
actions in an effort to achieve collective legitimization. In the
case of Korea the United States sought to legitimize a foreign
policy by U.N. sponsored military action and by a U.N. resolu-
tion labeling China an aggressor. There was also a struggle
for legitimization by the U.N. in an attempt by the United
States to attribute illegitimacy to the Peking government. By
invoking the Charter provision of Article 4, that the U.N. mem-
bers must be peace-loving, and thereby withholding Chinese
membership in the U.N., the U.S. hoped to achieve this end.32
In general, however, the granting and withholding of member-
ship in the U.N. has not been as potent an instrument for collec-
tive legitimization as it might have been. There are two reasons
for this: (1) the membership has not been limited to peace
loving states and, therefore, granting membership does not give
a state the moral stamp of approval that it is peace loving; and
30 Haas, supra note 7, at 312. Richard Van Wagenen reaches the opposite
conclusion: ". . . citing U.N. principles might be more of a justification
than a true motive for something which a member government wants
to do, seeking legitimization from the U.N. in the same way that bat-
tling troops seek the legitimization of God for their cause. Yet the mere
fact that the blessing is sought would tend to build up the legitimacy
of the blesser". See R, Van Wagenen. The Concept of Community and
the Future of the United Nations, in THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE BALANCE
461 (N. Padelford & L. Goodrich eds. 1965).
31 On the dominance of these two conflicts in the U.N., and in inter-
national relations generally, see H. ALKER, JR. & B. RUSSETT, WORLD
POLITICS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1965); and J. STOESSINGER, THE
MIGHT OF NATIONS (1963). The former study, however, also presents
evidence of other quite salient conflicts in the U.N.
32 See, e.g., the latest U.S. statement, reported in 8 U.N. MONTHLY
CHRONICLE 34 (Nov., 1971).
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(2) the membership issue was for a long time highly politicized
by the Cold War and the withholding of membership did not
attribute illegitimacy to a nation. Nevertheless the granting of
membership is considered an instrument for bestowing at least
some legitimacy. Accordingly, West Germany is willing to forego
U.N. membership to avoid having East Germany enjoy the
legitimizing effect of membership.
Cold War struggles for collective legitimization have also
been fought over resolutions, as in the case of the Soviet at-
tempt in the Security Council to label the U.S. U-2 flights "acts
of aggression" 3  More recently, there has been a battle over
the wording of a report from the Commission on Human Rights
to the Economic and Social Council. In this case, the Soviet
representative successfully proposed the deletion of a paragraph
containing the American charge that the Soviet Union was sup-
pressing free speech.34
It has been in realm of North-South relations, though, that
the U.N. has been most prominently utilized as an agent for
collective legitimization, especially in recent years. The U.N.
actions reflect the demands of its new members- Afro-Asian
states, excolonial-and developing states-which now constitute
a majority. These demands are for independence, unity, non-
intervention, modernization, and the recognition of the equal
status for non-whites.3 5 The U.N. capacity for legitimization
has been used for all of these objectives with varying success:
(1) The U.N. has played a role in legitimizing the establish-
ment of the newly independent countries by adopting the Dec-
claration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples, and, more generally, recognizing, with ap-
proval, self-determination and anti-colonialism. This created a
general climate of opinion that attributed illegitimacy to con-
tinued colonialism. Rupert Emerson has suggested that "The
case of Goa is a peculiarly striking illustration of the proposi-
tion, generally accepted by the U.N. majority, that all colonial-
ism is illegitimate and that the use of force to overthrow it is
therefore justified".3 6
Assessing the degree and significance of legitimacy and
illegitimacy bestowed by the U.N. in specific cases is very dif-
33The resolution was defeated. See J. STOESSINGER, THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE SUPERPOWERS 15 (1965).
34 N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1968, at 6, col. 3.
35 Id. at 5-6.
36 Emerson, supra note 16, at 136. [For a more recent article by Emerson
dealing with self-determination and touching on the legitimizing func-
tion of the U.N. see Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 Am. J. INT'L L.
459 (1971). Ed.]
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ficult. In the case of Algeria, even though the General Assem-
bly refused to pass several resolutions calling for Algerian self-
determination from 1956 to 1959 there was probably some legiti-
mizing effect. These resolutions were sponsored by large num-
bers of Asian and African countries3 7 and were much debated.
Thus one observer has concluded that "the annual Assembly
debates [gave] a vital international recognition and 'legiti-
macy' to the National Front of Liberation", and without this
factor Franco-Algerian negotiations would have occurred even
later .3 In other cases such as Indonesia the legitimizing role of
the U.N. has been negligible. During the period of the Indo-
nesian struggle for independence from the Netherlands, the
General Assembly resolutions did not call for independence or
self-determination but rather merely called for negotiations be-
tween the two parties.3 1
(2) As to the unity of the newly independent countries
the U.N.'s role has been only indirect with the exception of the
Congo. The U.N. has bestowed legitimacy to unification only in
the sense that by providing observation teams for plebiscites
it has assured that an appropriate self-determination procedure
has been properly executed. It has thereby given some legiti-
macy to the results no matter what they might be. Thus both
sections of British Togoland were united with the Gold Coast,
even though a plebiscite observed by the U.N. in the South
gave a majority vote to continuation under the trusteeship
system while the North gave a majority vote to union with the
Gold Coast. On the other hand, the U.N. has in a similar way
indirectly legitimized disunity, as in the case of the plebiscite
that separated Ruanda and Urundi.
(3) The newly independent countries including the coun-
tries of Latin America have used the U.N. to try to legitimize
economic assistance. Accordingly, the 1960's were declared the
Decade for Development, and the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was established to gain
special consideration for the developing countries in interna-
tional trade and tariff policies. Thus far, the movement for in-
creased economic assistance has not received the same degree
of morally based support as anti-colonialism.40 It seems likely,
37 Twenty-two countries in the 12th session. P. JACOB & A. ATHERTON,
THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 663 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as JACOB].
38 Johnson, Helping to Build New Stutes, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE
UNITED NATIONS 3 (F. Wilcox & J. Haviland eds. 1961).
" JACOB, supra note 37, ch. 20.
40L. PEARSON, PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT (1969).
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however, that this issue will be increasingly the focus of legiti.-
mization attempts in the U.N. in coming years. The developing
countries can be expected to base demands for economic assist-
ance on the need to right the past wrongs of political and
economic colonialism.4
1
(4) Finally, the Afro-Asian countries have employed the
U.N. to legitimize their demands for racial equality. The most
prominent proclamation in this regard was the Declaration on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which
was passed by the General Assembly in 1963.42 At this time
there were several other resolutions dealing with race relations,
but these were directed specifically at the Union of South
Africa. For ihstance, between August, 1963, and June, 1964, the
General Assembly adopted two resolutions and the Security
Council four resolutions condemning the practice of apartheid. 43
In regional organizations, as opposed to legitimization by
the U.N., the pattern has not been so clear. The use of these
organizations has varied as in the case of the U.N. As discussed
above, the United States has tried to use the O.A.S. to legiti-
mize American policy in Latin America. Regional organizations
may also be used to justify both unpopular actions and un-
popular inactions. Thus it has been suggested that the "com-
mitment to multilateral (O.A.S.) action on hemispheric prob-
lems has enabled governments to resist emotional demands for
the unilateral 'solution' of problems for which no acceptable
solutions are immediately obtainable".44 In particular, American
policy-makers tried to use the O.A.S. to "bury" the Cuban prob-
lem and legitimize inaction in the face of strong domestic public
demands for action.45 More recently, by way of contrast, Ameri-
can policy-makers have tried to use SEATO membership to
legitimize action in Southeast Asia; they have invoked the
SEATO treaty as "concrete" evidence of a legal and moral com-
mitment to take action.
Another regional organization, the Organization of African
Unity (O.A.U.), is noteworthy because of its apparent non-use
for collective legitimization purposes during its infancy. This
was so, partially because it was competing for support with
other regional African groups, and had very little claim to be
41 Declaration of Lima, UNCTAD Doc. No. MM/77/l/ll (1971).
42 G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
43 See Stevens, Issues Before the Nineteenth General Assembly, 550 IN-
TERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 546-55 (Nov., 1964).
44 SLATER, supra note 26, at 269.
45 Id.
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an authoritative agent of legitimization. The conflict among the
O.A.U. and the two smaller organizations, the Union Africaine
et Malgache and the Union of African States, reduced much of
its legitimizing potential. 4 More recently the O.A.U. has taken
steps in a direction that could lead to a significant role for it as
an agent of collective legitimization in Africa. The steps were
to intervene in the 1963 Algerian-Moroccan border conflict and
to play a minor role in the settlement of the dispute,47 and its
decision to back the federal government of Nigeria during its
civil war. 48 It seems likely that the O.A.U. will be used as a
collective legitimization agent in future African disputes.
The Consequences
The consequences of the function of collective legitimiza-
tion include both the facilitation of change in the international
system and the maintenance of stability. Although assessing the
impact of the U.N. on the decolonization process is an "iffy"
problem in the sense that one can only speculate about what
the situation would have been if the U.N. had not been active
in this realm, it nevertheless seems reasonable to agree that
"the U.N. was operating in an atmosphere of mounting anti-
colonialism which it certainly did not create but to which it
equally certainly contributed". 49  It made its contribution
through the acts of collective legitimization.
While the United Nations has, therefore, been a contribut-
ing factor in this revolutionary change in the international
system, at the same time it has been a stabilizing factor in the
national politics of the newly independent countries. While
being somewhat speculative, it seems reasonable to suppose
that regimes and authorities in these countries have been the
objects of at least some collective legitimization from the U.N.
46 See I. WALLERSTEIN, AFRICA: THE POLICS OF UNITY (1967); and Wal-
lerstein, The Early Years of the OAU, 20 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
774-87 (1966).
47See Wild, The Organization of African Unity and the Algerian-Mo-
roccan Border Conflict, 20 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 18-36 (1966).
48Resolutions against the Union of South Africa, and its racist policies
have continued. For material on four recent resolutions in this area
calling for (1) the continuation of measures and activities to combat
racial discrimination; (2) urging ratification of the 1966 International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;(3) reaffirming that apartheid was a crime against humanity and con-
demning countries for encouraging and inciting South Africa in per-
sisting with these policies; and (4) recommending a draft convention
on apartheid see 8 U.N. Monthly Chronicle, Dec. 1971, at 128-33. The
Organization for African Unity has also recently reiterated its stand
against South African policies in the Resolution on Apartheid and
Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 242, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. , at
U.N. Doc. CM/Res. 242/S/10272 (1971).
49 Emerson, supra note 16, at 126.
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in the eyes of their domestic publics. There has been a con-
tribution to stability at least to the extent that leading the anti-
colonial drive to independence and gaining admission to the
U.N. have enabled them to enjoy the benefits of collective
legitimization. As Seymour Lipset has asserted, stability "de-
pends not only on the system's efficiency in modernization, but
also upon the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political
system".50
Another consequence of the use of international organiza-
tions for collective legitimization is the impact on the structure
and the function themselves, as we have seen above. First,
there has been been a proliferation of agencies and subagencies.
One of the most prominent and active of these has been the
Special Committee established by the 15th session of the Gen-
eral Assembly to facilitate the implementation of the Declara-
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples. The composition of that committee has been such that
a militantly anti-colonial majority has been able to use it as a
forum for strongly-worded condemnations of continuing colonial
practices -oftentimes in the form of reports on particular
situations.
A second consequence for the organizations has been a de-
cline in the capacity to perform certain functions. In the case of
the United Nations the collective security function has fallen
into disrepute; and in the case of the Organization of American
States, the capacity to perform the collective legitimization
function itself has been reduced. Indeed, in the case of the
O.A.S. it may well be that the organization is generally less
effective because it has been utilized so frequenly for collective
legitimization purposes.
Finally, and most significantly, the use of international or-
ganizations as agents of collective legitimization both reflects
and promotes a trend in international relations to rely increas-
ingly on non-coercive forms of influence. Collective legitimiza-
tion is one such way to gain support for policies.
This is not to say that legitimacy is as important in inter-
national politics in this respect as it is in domestic politics.
While legitimacy may be the most important source of support
of outputs in domestic political systems, it is still only a minor
5OLipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development
and Political Legitimacy, 53 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 69-
105 (1959). On the "crisis of legitimacy", see S. LIPSET, THE FIRST NEW
NATION (1963); and POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (J.
LaPalombara & M. Weiner eds. 1966).
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source of support in the international system.51 Nor does legiti-
macy play precisely the same role in domestic and interna-
tional systems. In domestic systems, it is a basis for accepting
specific outputs as binding.52 In the international system, how-
ever, it plays this role only to the very limited extent that
there are outputs of international organizations that require
compliance. But most attempts to gain the collective legitimiza-
tion of international organizations do not seek a prescription
that will be followed by compliance or non-compliance. Rather,
collective legitimization is sought as a means to gain rather dif-
fuse support and to enchance one's own image in the world or
to denigrate another's.
The significance of the potential for a strategy of coercive
action in international relations is growing. Stanley Hoffman
has asserted that: "International politics in the past was often
an arena of coercion without persuasion; it is tending to become
an arena of persuasion, more or less coercive". 53 Continued and
increased reliance on collective legitimization can be expected
as one method in the attempt to persuade and to shape
perceptions.
51 EASTON, supra note 2, at 278, 284.
52 Id. at 278.
53 Hoffmann, Perception, Reality, and the Franco-American Conflict, 21
JOURNAL OF INTERNATONAL AFFAIRS 58-9 (1967).
